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1
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- Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
- This suit was brought in the District Court to enjoin the enforcement of
an award made by petitioner Crowell, as Deputy Commissioner of the
United States Employees' Compensation Commission, in favor of the
petitioner Knudsen and against the respondent Benson.
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2
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- The award was made under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Act of March 4, 1927, and rested upon the finding of
the deputy commissioner that Knudsen was injured while in the employ of
Benson and performing service upon the navigable waters of the United
States.
- The complainant alleged that the award was contrary to law for the
reason that Kundsen was not at the time of his injury an employee of the
complainant and his claim was not 'within the jurisdiction' of the
Deputy Commissioner.
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3
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- The question of the validity of the act may be considered in relation to
(1) its provisions defining substantive rights and (2) its procedural
requirements.
- First. The act has two limitations that are fundamental. It deals
exclusively with compensation in respect of disability or death
resulting 'from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the
United States' if recovery 'through workmen's compensation proceedings
may not validly be provided by State law,' and it applies only
when the relation of master and servant exists. Section 3.1 'Injury,'
within the statute, 'means accidental injury or death arising out of and
in the course of employment.
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4
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- In view of federal power to alter and revise the maritime law, there
appears to be no room for objection on constitutional grounds to the
creation of these rights, unless it can be found in the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. But it cannot be said that either the
classifications of the statute or the extent of the compensation
provided are unreasonable
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5
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- The objections to the procedural requirements of the act relate to the
extent of the administrative authority which it confers.
- The contention under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
relates to the determination of questions of fact.
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6
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- Apart from cases involving constitutional rights to be appropriately
enforced by proceedings in court, there can be no doubt that the act
contemplates that as to questions of fact, arising with respect to
injuries to employees within the purview of the act,
- the findings of the deputy commissioner, supported by evidence and
within the scope of his authority, shall be final.
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7
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- To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the
legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert, and inexpensive
method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are
peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative
agency specially assigned to that task.
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8
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- As to determinations of fact, the distinction is at once apparent
between cases of private right and those which arise between the
government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the
performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or
legislative departments.
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9
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- The statute provides for notice and hearing, and an award made without
proper notice, or suitable opportu- nity to be heard, may be attacked
and set aside as without validity.
- The objection is made that, as the deputy commissioner is authorized to
prosecute such inquiries as he may consider necessary, the award may be
based wholly or partly upon an ex parte investigation and upon unknown
sources of information, and that the hearing may be merely a formality.
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10
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- The statute, however, contemplates a public hearing, and regulations are
to require 'a record of the hearings and other proceedings before the
deputy commissioners.'
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11
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- The present case does not fall within the categories just described, but
is one of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to
another under the law as defined. But, in cases of that sort, there is
no requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of
the judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts
shall be made by judges. On the common-law side of the federal courts,
the aid of juries is not only deemed appropriate but is required by the
Constitution itself. In cases of equity and admiralty, it is historic
practice to call to the assistance of the courts, without the consent of
the parties, masters, and commissioners or assessors, to pass upon
certain classes of questions, as, for example, to take and state an
account or to find the amount of damages
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12
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- It may also be noted that, while on an appeal in admiralty cases 'the
facts, as well as the law, would be subjected to review and retrial,'
this Court has recognized the power of the Congress 'to limit the effect
of an appeal to a review of the law as applicable to facts finally
determined below.'
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13
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- The statute has a limited application.
- The act itself, where it applies, establishes the measure [intelligible
principle]of the employer's liability.
- For the purposes stated, we are unable to find any constitutional
obstacle to the action of the Congress in availing itself of a method
shown by experience to be essential in order to apply its standards to
the thousands of cases involved.
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14
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- What has been said thus far relates to the determination of claims of
employees within the purview of the act. A different question is
presented where the determinations of fact are fundamental or
jurisdictional, in the sense that their existence is a condition
precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme.
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15
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- In amending and revising the maritime law, the Congress cannot reach
beyond the constitutional limits which are inherent in the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction
- Unless the injuries to which the act relates occur upon the navigable
waters of the United States, they fall outside that jurisdiction.
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16
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- In relation to these basic facts, the question is not the ordinary one
as to the propriety of provision for administrative determinations.
- Nor have we simply the question of due process in relation to notice and
hearing.
- It is rather a question of the appropriate maintenance of the federal
judicial power in requiring the observance of constitutional
restrictions. It is the question whether the Congress may substitute for
constitutional courts, in which the judicial power of the United States
is vested, an administrative agency-in this instance a single deputy
commissioner-for the final determination of the existence of the facts
upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen
depend.
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17
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- In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial power of
the United States necessarily extends to the independent determination
of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to the performance of
that supreme function. The case of confiscation is illustrative, the
ultimate conclusion almost invariably depending upon the decisions of
questions of fact.
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18
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- In the present instance, the argument that the Congress has constituted
the deputy commissioner a fact-finding tribunal is unavailing, as the
contention makes the untenable assumption that the constitutional courts
may be deprived in all cases of the determination of facts upon evidence
even though a constitutional right may be involved.
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19
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- Assuming that the federal court may determine for itself the existence
of these fundamental or jurisdictional facts, we come to the question,
Upon what record is the determination to be made?
- A trial de novo on the issue of employment is appropriate in this case.
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