AD Sunset Reviews: Did the WTO Agreement Make Any Difference?*

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Abstract

The paper explores the determinants of the duration of antidumping orders on a wide sample of cases across time and countries. On the basis of a count of revocations for a panel of AD-using countries over 1979-2005, we find that the Uruguay Agreement’s introduction of mandatory sunset reviews in 1995 was associated with an increase from 18% to 31% in the proportion of AD measures revoked at five years. A survival analysis also shows that the average duration of AD measures around the world went down and that hazard functions jump up at five years for cases covered by the agreement. However, much of the adjustment to the WTO’s new rules on sunset reviews seems to have come from smaller Members.

Keywords: Antidumping, sunset reviews, WTO, survival analysis
JEL classification codes: F13

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