revised version forthcoming in the Journal of World Trade

Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements:

Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough

Chad P. Bown	Bernard M. Hoekman
Brandeis University and The Brookings Institution	The World Bank and CEPR

August 2007

Abstract

Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal WTO trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This paper examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce WTO rules and disciplines against small and poor members, bolstering the transparency function of the WTO is important to make trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. While our focus is on the WTO system, our arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements.