Reading:

1. Plato, Apology (entire text)

Notes on the reading:

1. As Grube explains in his introduction (pp. 21–22), juries in criminal trials in ancient Athens had the responsibility both of assessing guilt and, in case of conviction, of assigning the penalty. A jury could comprise hundreds of citizens, and it made its decisions by a majority vote. A noteworthy feature of the Athenian procedure is that, at the sentencing phase of a trial, the jury had to choose between two possible sentences, the one proposed by the prosecutor and the one proposed by the defendant. There were no statutes to determine the penalties for crimes, nor could a jury impose any penalty other than one proposed by either the prosecutor or the defendant.
   
2. The Apology comprises three speeches of Socrates at his trial: (i) the defense speech (apologia) proper, in which he defends himself both against popular opinion and against the formal charges made by Meletus and his associates (Stephanus 17a–35d/pp. 22–39); (ii) the speech in which, after being convicted, he proposes an alternative penalty to the one that his accusers have asked for (35e–38b/pp. 39–41); and (iii) the final speech, in which he replies to the sentence that has been passed on him (38c–42a/pp. 41–44).
   
3. In his second speech (35e–38b/pp. 39–41), Socrates proposes, as an alternative penalty, a fine of thirty minas, to be contributed by several of his friends (Plato among them). It is important to know that this was a very large sum of money. According to Grube (p. 25, n. 6), a mina was worth a thousand drachmas, and a drachma was the common wage for a day's labor. This means that the proposed fine is equal to about eighty years of an Athenian laborer's wages (if he worked six days per week).

Study questions:

1. What are the formal charges against Socrates? What has he done, according to his accusers, that constitutes "corrupting the young"? (See 24b–c/p. 28 and 26b/p. 30.)
   
2. Just before interrogating his principal accuser, Meletus, Socrates tells the jury that he will show that Meletus is guilty of "professing to be seriously concerned with things about none of which he has ever cared" (24c/pp. 28–29); and he repeats this charge twice subsequently (25c and 26b/p. 30). What are the "things" in question? Does Socrates' exchange with Meletus support this charge? Are Socrates' arguments compelling? Do they show that he is innocent of the charges against him? (Consider this question with respect to each of the several charges.)
   
3. Socrates says that "a man who is any good at all" should in his actions consider only "whether what he does is right or wrong, whether he is acting like a good or a bad man," and not "take into account the risk of life or death" (28b/pp. 32–33). Why does Socrates think that one should not take account of the risk of death? Is he saying that one should never do so? E.g., does Socrates' position imply that I am acting badly when I buckle my seatbelt in my car in order to reduce my chance of being killed in a collision?
   
4. How can Socrates say that his accusers cannot harm him, when he admits that they may kill him (30c/p. 35)? (Actually, the Apology does not fully explain Socrates' views on this point; they are explained more fully in the Gorgias, which we shall read later.) If he believes that his accusers cannot harm him, and that one should disregard the risk of death, why does he bother to defend himself? On the other hand, if he is trying to get himself acquitted of the criminal charges, why does he not do the things that, according to him, are most likely to get him acquitted, such as trying to win the jury's pity (34c–35b/pp. 38–39; 35d/p. 39; 38d–e/p. 42)?
   
5. What reasons does Socrates give for his having stayed out of political affairs (31c–32e/pp. 35–37)? When says that "a man who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a public life if he is to survive for even a short time" (32a/p. 36), does he mean that he has stayed out of public affairs in order to preserve his own life? Are his statements compatible with what he has said earlier about disregarding the risk of death?
6. After he has been convicted and has the chance to propose an alternative penalty, why does Socrates say that a lifetime of free meals would be a fitting sentence for him (36d–e/p. 40)? Why does he not propose exile as his punishment (37c–38a/p. 41)? (It seems likely that, had he done so, he would have received that as his sentence, rather than the death penalty sought by the prosecution.)
   
7. Socrates says that he has a "divine or spiritual sign," which sometimes turns him away from things that he proposes to do, but never encourages him to do anything (31d/p. 36; 40c/p. 43; 41d/p. 44). He also appears to believe that a god speaks through the priestess at Delphi (21a/pp. 25–26), and claims that his philosophical occupation has been "enjoined on [him] by the god, by means of oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine manifestation has ever ordered a man to do anything" (33c/p. 37). On the other hand, what he claims that his divine sign and the oracle have directed him to do is to examine those who think themselves wise, and he repeatedly professes that he himself is not wise, except in knowing that he lacks wisdom. Is Socrates' belief in the divine authority of his "sign" and of the oracle at Delphi compatible with his conception of his philosophical mission and his denial of any possession of wisdom?