Reading: Plato, Meno, 86c–100b (pp. 78–92; i.e., the remainder of the dialogue)

Notes and questions:

1. Note that the order in which the dialogue Meno has been inserted into our book does not reflect any historical order. The dialogues Euthphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo are arranged in the book according to the order of the events represented in them, but the Meno must be set in a prior time, as Socrates in this dialogue has not yet been prosecuted (if it took place after the Apology, he would be in prison or dead). In fact, a man who would later be one of his prosecutors, namely Anytus, enters into the dialogue at 90a.
2. You may be puzzled by the geometric analogy that Socrates advances at 87a–b (in the words in quotation marks). So you should be, since even scholarly experts seem to be in some uncertainty over what Socrates is saying here. But, regardless of what he is saying about geometry, you should be able to understand what the "hypothesis" is that he is proposing, in what follows, for his and Meno's investigation of virtue (87b–c). It is that virtue is teachable if and only if it is knowledge. (Note that Socrates says, taking account of the theory of learning that he has just advanced, that it should make no difference if we say "teachable" or "recollectable": 87c.) To say that this is a hypothesis is to say that it is being assumed for purposes of this inquiry, but not taken as known to be true; and in fact, toward the end of the dialogue, Socrates will discover grounds for rejecting the hypothesis.
   
3. In the passage from 87d to 89a, Socrates argues that virtue is a kind of wisdom. What is his argument for this claim (or rather, what are his arguments, since there seem to be two)? Should we be so easily convinced as Meno is? (Note that Socrates seems to assume that wisdom is a kind of knowledge. Note also that, later on in the dialogue, Socrates raises doubts about the conclusion that he and Meno affirm here.)
   
4. On what grounds do Socrates and Meno conclude that it is through learning that the good (i.e., good human beings) become good (89a–c)?
5. On what grounds does Socrates doubt the very conclusion that he has just reached, namely that virtue is knowledge (89d–e)?
6. What seems to be the issue between Socrates and Anytus when they discuss the sophists (91b–92c)? Do you think that Socrates is primarily concerned with defending the reputation of these men?
   
7. In the remainder of his conversation with Anytus (92d–95a), what does Socrates say that makes Anytus leave in anger? What philosophical point does Socrates seem to be making with his several anecdotes about the sons of famous men?
8. What leads Socrates and Meno to the (tentative) conclusion that virtue cannot be taught (95a–96d)?
9. Earlier in the dialogue (88c–89a), Socrates and Meno arrived at the conclusion that the soul acts well if it is directed by wisdom and not otherwise. Now, at 96e, Socrates says that "it is ridiculous that we failed to see that it is not only under the direction of wisdom that men succeed in their affairs." What thing other than wisdom or knowledge does Socrates think can provide human beings with successful direction (see 97a–d)? 
10. How does Socrates draw the contrast between knowledge and correct opinion (97d–98a)?
11. How does Socrates' view of the usefulness of correct opinion affect the hypothesis that he and Meno affirmed earlier (87b–c), that virtue is knowledge if and only if it is teachable, or their earlier conclusion (89d–e) that virtue is teachable if and only if there are teachers of it (see 98c–e)?