Instructor’s note: In the following outline, I have tried to represent the contents of Hume’s essay in terms as close as possible, within limits of intelligibility, to his own. Where the contents of a stretch of the text have been represented by a declarative sentence, there should be no inference that this is the entire point of what Hume says in the part of the text in question, or even that it is the best possible way of representing his meaning. In short, do not rely on this as a substitute for reading the text itself.

I. The idea of a standard of taste (pp. 308–309)

(¶¶ 1–2) Comparison of taste and opinion: variety in opinion is more apparent than real; variety in taste is more real than initially apparent
(¶¶ 3–5) Comparison of taste and morals: in both, widespread agreement about the evaluative import of terms, but not about the particulars to which those terms apply
(¶ 6) The idea of a standard of taste
(¶ 7) A species of common sense that opposes this idea: “all sentiment is right”
(¶ 8) A species of common sense that supports the idea: some objects of taste are plainly inferior to others (e.g., Ogilby to Milton)

(¶ 9) Rules of composition are derived from observation of what commonly pleases
(¶ 10) And yet human sentiments will not in every case conform to those rules
(¶ 11) In the absence of certain obstructions, Homer pleases universally
(¶¶ 12–13) There are general principles of approbation and blame; apparent counterinstances are due to defect in the “organ” [taste]
(¶ 14–17) Defects of taste, I: want of delicacy

(¶ 15) Sancho’s story
(¶ 16) General rules of beauty make it possible to prove who has delicate taste
(¶ 17) The superiority of the more delicate taste is universally acknowledged

(¶¶ 18–19) Defects of taste, II: want of practice

(¶ 18) Practice in a particular art increases delicacy with respect to it
(¶ 19) Practice with a particular work may be necessary for judgment of it

(¶ 20) Defects of taste, III: want of comparison (of different species and degrees of excellence)
(¶¶ 21–22) Defects of taste, IV: prejudice

(¶ 21) True judgment of a work requires placing oneself in the position of its intended audience
(¶ 22) Prejudice perverts the operations of taste by making impossible the comprehension and comparison of all the parts of complex objects

(¶¶ 23–27) How to find the true judges (and why their joint verdict is a standard)

(¶ 23) Summary of the defects and requisites of taste
(¶ 25) Whether someone possesses the attributes listed is a question of fact, not of sentiment; that someone possessing those attributes has the superior taste is acknowledged by universal sentiment
(¶ 26) There is more lasting agreement about poetry than about philosophy or science: so it is not difficult to find, even in particulars, the standard of taste
(¶ 27) The esteem we have for those of delicate taste allows their judgment to prevail

(¶ 28) A certain degree of diversity in estimates of degrees of excellence is inevitable because of differences in temperaments (“humours”) and customs (“manners”)
(¶ 29) Readers of different temperaments, or the same reader at different times of life, will have different favorite writers (examples)
(¶ 30) Different modes of writing have different partisans
(¶ 31) We are more pleased with, and more likely to be moved by, pictures of life resembling what we are accustomed to

(¶ 32) Taste may and should accept “innocent peculiarities” [relative to what one is accustomed to] in represented manners, but not the representation of vice without blame
(¶ 33) One cannot indulge moral vice as one can speculative error
(¶¶ 34–36) The latter include errors in religious belief (several examples)

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