McFall v. Shimp 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (1978)
Allegheny County Court, 1978
The Plaintiff, Ribert McFall, suffers from a rare form of bone marrow disease [aplastic anemia] and the prognosis for his survival is very dim, unless he receives a bone marrow transplant from a compatible donor. Finding a compatible donor, however, is a very difficult task, and limited to a selection among close relatives. After a search and certain tests, it has been determined that only the Defendant is suitable as a donor. The Defendant refuses to submit to the necessary transplant, and before the Court is a request for a preliminary injunction which seeks to compel the defendant to submit to further tests, and eventually the bone marrow transplant.
Although a diligent search has produced no authority, the Plaintiff cites the ancient statute of King Edward I. St. Westminster 2, 13 Ed., I, c 24, pointing, as is the case, that this Court is a successor of the English courts of Chancery and derives power from this statute, almost 700 years old. The question posed by the Plaintiff is that, in order to save the life of one of its members by the only means available, may society infringe upon one's absolute right to his "bodily security"?
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save that human being or to rescue. A great deal has been written regarding this rule which, on the surface, appears to be revolting in a moral sense. Introspection, however, will demonstrate that the rule is founded upon the very essence of our free society. It is noteworthy that counsel for the Plaintiff has cited authority which has developed in other societies in support of the Plaintiff's request in this instance. Our society, contrary to many others, has as its first principle, the respect for the individual, and that society and government exist to protect the individual from being invaded and hurt by another. Many societies adopt a contrary view which has the the individual existing to serve the society as a whole.
In preserving such a society as we have, it is bound to happen that great moral conflicts will arise and will appear harsh in a given instance. In this case, the chancellor is being asked to force one member of society to undergo a medical procedure which would provide that part of that individual's body would be removed from him and given to another so that the other could live. Morally, this decision rests with the Defendant, and, in the view of the Court, the refusal of the Defendant is morally indefensible. For our law to COMPEL the Defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change the very
concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual and would
impose a rule which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn.
This request is not to be compared with an action at law for damages, but rather is an action in equity before a Chancellor, which, in the ultimate, if granted, would require the [forcible] submission to the medical procedure.
For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its
members and suck from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence.
Forceible extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind. Such would raise the spectre
of the swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this portends.
The court makes no comment on the law regarding the Plaintiff's right at an action at law for damages, but has no alternative but to deny the requested equitable relief. An Order will be entered denying the request for a preliminary injunction.
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