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The 1974 Congressional Initiative In Budget Making

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On July 12, 1974, President Nixon signed into law what is being heralded as the most important budget reform measure since the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. In less than three months, new Budget Committees in both Senate and House would be holding hearings to determine what the Administration was doing to curb inflation and what was the role of federal fiscal policies as contributors.

While passage of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 had been proclaimed a major advance in redressing the congressional-presidential imbalance, knowledgeable participants and observers remain aware that passage of legislation itself does not guarantee congressional reassertion of leadership in fiscal matters without a corresponding performance.

That a compromise between House and Senate versions of the legislation was forthcoming became known on June 5, 1974, when the Conference Committee announced reaching agreement. Supported by a massive staff effort, the conferees had labored long to reconcile HR 7130, passed December 5, 1973, with a Senate version of March 22, 1974. After passage by the House on June 18 and by the Senate on June 21 and a delayed enrollment, it became Public Law 93-344 (88 Stat 297).

Senator Sam Irvin, chairman of the Government Operations Committee and Senate Floor Manager, had proclaimed this measure to be the most important piece of legislation with which he was involved in his culminating 20-year career in the Senate and "the finest example of the legislative process at work that I have witnessed."¹

While the need for congressional budget reform had been recognized for decades, a major impetus during the 20-month congressional struggle with procedural reform was its concern for recouping

- The new Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, heralded by some as the most important budget reform measure since the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, has the objective of enabling Congress to gain a better control over spending priorities and other aspects of the budget process. It provides for new congressional institutions, an improved analytical capability, a revised timetable with the fiscal year shifted to begin October 1, and a demand on the President to furnish additional budget data. It further curtails the President's authority to withhold appropriations.

Its new Budget Committees, assisted by a new Congressional Budget Office, are to take the lead in establishing target relationship between appropriation totals and revenue expectations early in each session and then lead in reaffirming the congressional position, once appropriation totals are known just before the beginning of the new fiscal year. It also requires an overt congressional approval of any appropriation rescissions.

New officials, tasked with carrying out the Act, concur in the difficulty of this undertaking because of the stringent time limitations, the complexity of forces to be reconciled, and the scope of decisions to be made.

initiatives lost to the Executive Branch over a long period of time. The most identifiable thrust for this reform stems from the well-publicized presidential-congressional confrontations of 1972 when President Nixon gave notice that he would veto measures that would lead to excessive spending, then estimated to be \$7 billion above the \$246.3 in the budget announced six months earlier.² He went on to criticize the system of "independent, unrelated actions on various spending programs" by which Congress "arrives at total spending in an accidental, haphazard manner." His challenge to the 92nd Congress to impose a \$250 billion ceiling

on FY 1973 outlays led to an agreement in principle as to the desirability of that amount but that the President should not be the one to set the priorities inherent in such action.

This acknowledgment of the desirability of curtailing spending but an inability to establish the priorities for such curtailment was well publicized, and resulted in a resolve to make a concentrated effort to change congressional procedures for handling the budget. An additional stimulus was provided by the dozens of budget reform bills already introduced and demanding attention, as well as the increasingly frequent need to raise debt ceilings. A Joint Study Committee on Budget Control, co-chaired by Congressmen Al Ullman and Jamie Whitten, appointed in accordance with the debt ceiling act of 1972,³ immediately began to work and on April 18, 1974, issued its final report. This report was to form the framework for subsequent deliberations.⁴

The Legislative Climate

The mandate given to the Joint Study Committee by the 92nd Congress was to find a means of improving congressional control of budgetary outlay and receipt totals. However, some second thoughts and changes in the fiscal climate were to result in pressures to remain flexible to increase spending in particular areas; rather than a mechanism dominated by money committee interests, they would favor securing more information from the Executive regarding spending alternatives and exercising greater oversight. Others would place greater reliance on support staffing and conducting better program evaluations. At no time was any serious consideration given to providing flexibility through such devices as "item veto" or granting authority to adjust tax rates, both of which increase presidential prerogatives and had been central to previous reform recommendations. The mood was that a means had to be found whereby Congress could establish the policy and the priorities and exert the control, in short, do its own budgeting. Concurrently there were other efforts directed at curbing presidential powers.⁵

Yet for all the initial expressions of desire and resolve, a significant relaxing of the "cut spending" mechanisms in the Joint Study Committee bills introduced in the House and Senate took place. This was to be recognized as the price of support for progress on the legislation.

Antecedents to Congressional Budget Reform

The history of the conflict over the nation's purse strings will attest that confrontation is not new, just more complicated. The countercyclical and other economic policy questions broaden the scope of decisions far beyond the historic budgetary function of funding the Executive Branch programs. Reform proposals are advanced with the recognition that the most obvious solutions have been tried before and found wanting.

The record dealing with the need for and efforts at congressional budget reform is extensive.⁶ Central is a description of uncoordinated handling of authorization, revenue, and appropriations matters with no congressional element being charged with coordinating the income-outgo relationships. To this is added the inflexibility brought about by entitlement programs locked in substantive legislation; this makes almost three-fourths of the spending relatively uncontrollable. There is criticism of the inefficiencies and uncertainties brought about by the inability to pass appropriation acts before the beginning of the fiscal year. In addition, there is the record of unsuccessful efforts at reform, particularly those aimed at attaining a more coordinated overview, beginning with the legislative budget provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.

From this history emerged the premise that it is necessary each year, hopefully on a joint basis, to compare revenue and spending estimates and come up with a dollar target and then measure appropriation actions against this figure. This would have to be undertaken in the face of a record of obstacles associated with maintaining organizational and individual prerogatives so dear to congressional operations. This does not deny the utility of concomitant devices such as improved staffing, better information, and improved scheduling.

Principal Provisions of PL 93-344

After expressing purposes of assuring effective congressional control over the budgetary process, providing annual congressional determination of appropriate levels of federal revenues and expenditures, establishing national budget priorities, securing more useful information from the Executive, and controlling impoundments, the legislation embodies the following major changes in the

congressional institutions, procedures, and timetable for handling budgetary matters:

- Establishing new Budget Committees in House and Senate.
- Establishing a new Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
- Making coordinated overall decisions on revenue-spending relationships prior to individual revenue or appropriation decisions.
- Providing a revised timetable.
- Requiring more information from the Executive, and strengthening the General Accounting Office (GAO) role in its organization and validation.
- Strengthening anti-impoundment laws.

The arrangement whereby separate Budget Committees were created in both House and Senate avoided the problems that over the years had plagued attempts to establish a Joint Committee on the Budget. However, this arrangement will bring additional timing and reconciliation problems.

To these Budget Committees is entrusted the crucial task of establishing the congressional budget policies and priorities. After having been furnished specified inputs from the President, CBO, and standing and joint committees, they must, within a rigid time schedule, establish a congressional position or target as to overall size and functional mix that will be observed in subsequent consideration and passage of appropriation and other legislation.

The device for establishing this position is the concurrent resolution. The first concurrent resolution is to be reported by the Budget Committees by April 15 for passage by May 15 as a target or tentative congressional budget. After the individual appropriation bills are acted upon, the Budget Committees must report and by September 15 the Congress must complete action on a second concurrent resolution. This resolution, which is in effect the final congressional budget or ceiling, must specify to the appropriate committees the amounts, if any, by which changes must be made in budget authority, outlays, and revenue and debt limits. By September 25 these committees are to report through the Budget Committees a reconciliation bill to effect any changes necessary to conform to the second concurrent resolution. Congress is not to adjourn until it has approved this reconciliation legislation.

While the first concurrent resolution can be

CONGRESSIONAL TIMETABLE

Action Required	Final Date
President submits current services budget	Nov. 10
Joint Economic Committee submits economic evaluation	Dec. 31
President submits his budget	15th day after Congress meets
Standing Committees, Joint Economic Committee, and Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation submit reports to Budget Committees	Mar. 15
Congressional Budget Office submits report on fiscal policy and national budget priorities to Budget Committees	Apr. 1
Budget Committees report first concurrent resolution to their Houses	Apr. 15
Committees report bills and resolutions authorizing new budget authority	May 15
Congress completes all action on first concurrent resolution	May 15
Congress completes action on all bills and resolutions providing new budget and new spending authority	7th day after Labor Day
Congress completes all action on second required concurrent resolution	Sept. 15
Congress completes action on reconciliation bill or resolution, or both, implementing second required concurrent resolution	Sept. 25
Fiscal Year begins (beginning in 1976)	Oct. 1

expected to deal with macro economic matters and broad functional allocations, proponents of particular programs will recognize the extent to which their interests can be jeopardized at this stage. Inasmuch as the Budget Committees are required to hold hearings and many different groups are invited to provide testimony, it is

inevitable that the committees will be hard pressed to report by the deadlines. Although the views of the committees regarding program allocations will be expressed in their accompanying committee report, rather than in the concurrent resolution, it can be expected that many forces for particularistic, as opposed to macro determinations, will still be exerted at this stage.

The makeup of the Budget Committees recommended by the Joint Study Committee, particularly the provision that two-thirds of the membership and a rotating chairman come from the money committees, came under immediate attack. An outcome was that the chairmanship designation was eliminated. In the House, membership was increased and money committee representation reduced; five of the House Budget Committee members are from Appropriations, five from Ways and Means, two named by majority and minority party leadership, and 11 from legislative committees. When the 94th Congress was organized the total committee membership was increased from 23 to 25.⁷ This was in line with the decision of the Democratic majority to have a two to one majority plus one on each committee. Members of the Senate Budget Committee, now increased from 15 to 16, are selected by regular procedures. The House has limitations on tenure of members; the Senate will eventually restrict the number of other major committee assignments a Budget Committee member may hold.

The Senate moved quickly to name its Budget Committee members. Senator Edmund Muskie of the Government Operations Committee, a strong force in passage of the Act, emerged as the Democratic Conference choice for the chairmanship by July 18.⁸ By July 25 he was approved, along with eight other Democrats, chosen without regard for seniority and ostensibly representing a balance in geography and philosophy. Six Republicans, with Peter H. Dominick, since defeated for reelection and replaced by Henry Bellmon, as ranking minority member, were approved on August 7.

Chairmanship of the House Budget Committee was voted to Al Ullman, second ranking member of Ways and Means, on August 7 when the Democratic Caucus confirmed recommendations of the Steering and Policy Committee. At the beginning of the 94th Congress when Ullman became Chairman of Ways and Means, Budget Committee chairmanship was voted to Brock Adams of Washington, previously the leading

contender. At the same time, John Rhodes, Minority Leader, who initially headed the nine-member (now eight-member) Republican contingent, vacated the committee, leaving Delbert L. Latta of Ohio to be ranking minority member.

Staffing the Budget Committees, recognized as an urgent requirement, may be virtually complete. Senate and House Budget Committee meetings devoted to procedures, organization, and staffing were held on August 13 and September 18, respectively. The House staff director, a long-time professional aid in the Congressional Research Service and on staff assignments, Walter Kravitz, was named on August 15. Within a week, a Senate staff director, more closely identified with Democratic partisanship in congressional staff assignments, Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., was named. Key appointments to both committees were soon to follow.

The staffing patterns of both committees are similar in having economists, priorities specialists, and subject matter specialists for major functional areas. Both staffs approximate 60, to include professionals and support staffs.

Both committees have eschewed having subcommittees, justifiable on their mission of providing a macro-overview, the House specifically exempting the Budget Committee when recent rule changes prescribed four subcommittees for those with 20 or more members. Organization of work assignments is more nearly in line with the functional areas and special studies.

Both committees moved to hold hearings on the state of the economy, the Senate beginning on August 14 and the House on September 25. Plans were made for establishing trial-basis targets for the FY 1976 Budget. Hearings have continued and both Budget Committees have restated their plans for taking an overall macro position by May 15 and then follow-on with a trial second concurrent resolution by September 15. There are some uncertainties regarding the degree of detail that can be incorporated, in some part likely due to delays necessitated in filling vacancies and inability of the CBO to provide inputs. The fact that Budget Committee staffs have had to act to fill this void can raise speculation as to whether the CBO, now in initial stages of establishment, can attain the stature and role originally anticipated for it.

The costly delay in making the appointment prerequisite to establishment of the CBO followed House-Senate disagreement on who would be

chosen as Director. This was finally resolved with the announcement on February 24, 1975, of the appointment of Alice M. Rivlin of The Brookings Institution, a former Assistant Secretary of HEW and well-known as a writer on the economics of the national budget process.⁹ Appointment was made by House Speaker Carl Albert and Senate President Pro Tem James Eastland. While the criteria specify fitness and appointment without regard to political affiliation, it was never anticipated that the Director be unaware of the political. The grade is Executive Level III at \$40,000, the initial term will end on January 3, 1979; subsequent terms will be for four years. The CBO Director has authority to appoint a deputy director and is removable by either House by resolution.

The size and configuration of the CBO has been the subject of speculation, but with the recognition that the views of the Director should be paramount. Director Rivlin is quoted as not being sure the staff would ever reach 150, a number that was discussed during formulation of the Act. It would be a balanced staff representing all parts of the political spectrum except the "lunatic fringe" at both ends. An additional guide is provided by the conferees who stated that to the maximum extent the CBO should use the resources of the existing congressional agencies, to include the General Accounting Office, Library of Congress, and Office of Technology Assessment, as well as make appropriate use of information and resources developed by executive agencies.¹⁰

An additional influence will result from the experiences encountered in choosing the first CBO Director. The delay prior to the December adjournment was reported as a manifestation of the different views held by Chairmen Muskie and Ullman as to the role the CBO should play. At that time the House Committee is reported to have envisioned the CBO as a service agency with a Director whose forte was ability to supervise up to 100 professionals. The Senate Committee saw the Director leading in making policy proposals as well as being an administrator.¹¹ The stalemate was broken when the new House chairman, Brock Adams, accepted the Senate Committee's candidate.

While the primary mission of the CBO is to provide services, including loans of personnel, to the Budget Committees, it is also charged with providing services on any matters pertaining to the congressional budget process. Accordingly, the

standing committees, and particularly the appropriations and tax committees, will have significant claims on its services. Members will be entitled to information already being prepared by budget, appropriations, and tax committees.

Upon appointment of the Director of the CBO, the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures was abolished and its functions and personnel transferred to the CBO. This provides a small core of experienced personnel engaged in an ongoing appropriations scorekeeping, projections, and publication process.

One forecast of the analytical role that may be played by the CBO is indicated by the requirement that on each April 1, the Director will report to the Budget Committees with respect to fiscal policy for the coming fiscal year and that the report shall also include:

... a discussion of national budget priorities, including alternative ways of allocating budget authority and budget outlays for each fiscal year among major programs or functional categories, taking into account how such alternative allocations will meet major national needs and affect balanced growth and development of the United States."¹²

The Director is also authorized to submit such further reports "as may be necessary or appropriate to provide such Committees with information, data, and analyses for the performance of their duties and functions."

While the priorities problem inherent in the CBO providing services to several different elements may be ameliorated by the staggered deadlines for the different types of reporting, it will be difficult at best. The CBO will likewise be challenged to maintain a balance between its long-range endeavors and handling the immediate demands, as well as between the technical and political. The political perspective will more likely be provided by committee staffs.

Coordinating Revenue/Appropriation Decisions

Completion of the first concurrent resolution by May 15 will signal action on authorization, appropriation, and entitlement bills. In mid-September Congress will move to reconcile the target and the cost of the pieces, resolving any discrepancies. Predictions for the success or failure of this new procedure will probably be based on the range of discrepancies appearing at this stage. It can be anticipated that small discrepancies can be compromised. With large differences, the new

procedure as a disciplinarian will get its most significant challenge.

It is recognized that ultimate control over spending levels cannot be accomplished without some additional control over the programs in which spending levels are dictated by entitlements and backdoor spending devices. Exemptions, including social security trust funds, 90 per cent self-financed trust funds, and general revenue sharing, are specified. New contract or borrowing authority is subject to amounts provided in appropriation acts. New entitlements are subject to the reconciliations process. Those practices that have resulted in a built-in system of supplementals and budget amendments, such as not budgeting for statutory pay raises, appear to require significant modification. Inclusion of the off-budget agencies and revenue sharing have been made subjects for further study.

Concern for meshing the many actions involved in passing appropriations was expressed by, among others, the conferees:

It will require the full cooperation of the budget, authorizing, and appropriations committees to make the new congressional budget process work. Any slippage early in the year will compound the unavoidably tight schedule in the period just prior to the start of the new fiscal year. If continuing resolutions are to be discarded as a way of coping with budget delays, the managers believe that it will be necessary to hold the four main phases of the congressional process (authorizations, budget resolutions, spending measures, and reconciliations) to the completion dates assigned. . . .¹³

The conferees are among those who believe it will be necessary to authorize programs a year or more in advance of the period for which appropriations will be made and to develop a pattern of advance authorizations for those now authorized on an annual or multi-year basis. This is a less-than-ideal solution in view of the length of the cycle.

Senate Budget Committee Chairman Muskie is reported to have anticipated that it would take two or three years for the procedures to work smoothly; his staff director, Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., is quoted as giving the procedure a 50-50 chance for the FY 1977 Budget.¹⁴ Other views range from entirely pessimistic to there being "a long and tortuous road" passable with sufficient resolve.

In order to allow more time for making additional determinations and, hopefully, to eliminate the serious problem of late appropriations and reliance on continuing resolutions, the fiscal

year is changed. Beginning with FY 1977, it will begin on October 1 and extend through the following September. This provision had been opposed by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) representatives as being unduly disruptive to working schedules and procedures, including recipients of grants. There will be a two-part submission of the President's budget. The current services portion is due by November 10, eventually to be submitted less than six weeks after the close of the fiscal year, beginning in 1975. The regular budget submission remains the same as under current law, namely within 15 days after Congress reconvenes in January. The Current Services Budget will show estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations as though all existing programs and activities were to be carried on at current levels with no policy change. This two-part submission is to give congressional staffs more time to analyze the programs. It will also contribute to continued and, more likely, increased incremental analysis because of the increase-decrease emphasis inherent in comparing and reconciling the two submissions.

The shift in the fiscal year period necessitates a three-month transition period from July 1 through September 30, 1976. The President has responded by including a special section devoted to the transition in the Budget for Fiscal Year 1976.¹⁵ Included are statements of receipts, outlays, and budget authority in a number of different classifications, including aid to state and local governments, and sources of financing and debt charges. There is also a statement of new data requirements and other changes brought about by the Act.

The requirement that new authorizations for spending programs be submitted by May 15 of the year before the beginning of the budget fiscal year represents one of the conferees' contributions to a hopeful insuring that work on authorizations be accomplished in time to prevent interfering with action on the appropriations. Committee-initiated authorizations for new spending programs are spared the year-in-advance requirement but must be reported by May 15. At best, this is a long lead time.

It is apparent from these provisions that the President's Budget as a unified statement of his priorities and the only accepted alternative is under significant attack.

In addition to the discipline of a timetable and a target, there is the requirement that analysis be based on additional information. The President is directed to present budget information in such

form as to facilitate framing the first concurrent resolution. The budget, along with inputs from other congressional elements received by March 15, will enable the Budget Committees to report their position as to appropriate levels of total budget authority and outlays classified by major functional category, as well as amounts for contingencies and other intragovernmental transactions. In the comparison with estimated income, any change in taxes or debt ceiling required will be made explicit.

One strength of the resolution as a control on subsequent actions is that it can be written to specify that appropriation bills not be enrolled until the final congressional budget and reconciliation bills have been approved. It may also specify "any other procedure which is considered appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act."¹⁶

Among other demands on the President is a requirement that the budget include information on the level of tax expenditures; comparisons between estimates and actual for revenues and expenditures for past periods; updated estimates by April 10 and July 15; and for authorized programs, estimates of grants and contracts for the subsequent fiscal year.

More categorization is in the offing. Beginning with FY 1979, estimates are to be stated in terms of a detailed structure of national needs tied in with agency missions and programs.

A not-uncontroversial provision provides that the Comptroller General take the lead in an ongoing three-way effort with OMB and Treasury, and otherwise have an enhanced role, in developing standard terminology, definitions, and classifications for fiscal, budgetary, and program-related data. This shift in leadership was made with the objective of insuring that agencies' submissions be more amenable to congressional analytical needs.

There are also provisions for increasing program review and evaluation activities by and in behalf of congressional committees. Apprised of the growing capability of the General Accounting Office for program evaluation and program results auditing, the legislation augments ongoing authorities, particularly those granted in Sec. 204 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.¹⁷ The Comptroller General, either on his own initiative, or on request of a committee with jurisdiction, is required to review, evaluate, and recommend methods for review and evaluation of existing programs. When requested, he is required to assist the committees in formulating statements of legis-

lative objectives as well as methods for reporting on and evaluating the actual performance. He will also assist in evaluating the quality of program reviews and similar studies prepared by and for federal agencies. An Office of Program and Budget Analysis, authorized by the Act, has been established.

The Budget Committees are charged with continued study of effectiveness of both new and existing programs, time limitations for program authorizations, and techniques of human resource accounting for evaluation measures. Congressional committees are authorized to conduct or contract for program evaluations or require the agencies to do so and report the results to them. Techniques mentioned are pilot testing, cost/benefit comparisons, and scheduling evaluations to take place after a defined time period.

Strengthened Anti-Impoundment Laws

Title X of PL 93-344, titled "Impoundment Control Act of 1974," amends the anti-deficiency act to narrow the purposes for which budgetary reserves may be established. It also requires that funds not needed be reported by the President for confirming congressional rescission action within 45 days. Deferrals of use of budget authority will be reported, subject to a resolution of disapproval by either house. The Comptroller General is brought into an oversight and advisory position on such proposals. He is also empowered to bring civil actions to insure funds be made available for obligation under specified conditions. The provision for distinguishing rescissions and deferrals was a conferees' compromise of House and Senate versions resulting from the concern with a host of different anti-impoundment proposals.

Beginning on September 20, 1974, President Ford submitted a series of reports on deferrals and requests for rescission action. He cited an Attorney General's opinion to the effect that anti-impoundment provisions referred only to budget authority enacted subsequent to passage of the Act. HR 17505, which lumped together a number of requests, was referred to the House Appropriations Committee, reported to and passed by House and Senate. It was signed by President Ford on December 21, 1974.¹⁸ In this case, the amount actually rescinded was but a small fraction of the amounts included as recapitulations as well as requests for action. As may be expected, many difficulties in definition, classification, and juris-

diction have emerged. Hopefully, these problems may be worked out.

Conclusions

Although the validation of PL 93-344 as a budget reform measure will come in implementation, a number of conclusions can be drawn:

The procedure to insure a comparison of revenues and planned spending for an overall fiscal position can become, as it is designed to be, a means of a coordinated approach to national spending priorities. But there is no guarantee that this will happen. Rules can be waived and deadlines missed as time passes. The Act does not bind Congress to any position that cannot be changed by a majority.

The changed fiscal year will initially be a burden. The new timetable imposes a lengthened period between proposal of authorizations and their approval and also between budget formulation and making appropriations. This will continue to be a problem, particularly in periods of rising costs. At best, the continuing resolutions can be eliminated; at worst there will be the disruptions

without the gains.

The new organizations and increased staffing should lead to better structured information, improved analysis, and better decisions. Care must be continuous to avoid the jurisdictional problems inherent in the new arrangements. The information and testifying requirements can become onerous unless submissions are formulated and handled at the proper level of detail.

The time schedule is tight but accomplishable if there is sufficient change in the traditional way Congress does business. Decisions will have to be made quickly and with an increasing exposure of alternatives.

There will be an extensive learning experience with few precedents. Much will depend on the skills of those in positions of leadership and upon the will that can be brought to bear. Risks are present, as has been indicated by the delay in filling the CBO directorship, but there are expressions that this represents a one-time difficulty and not necessarily a precedent. There have been many expressions of resolve to make the process work. It may be hoped that in this long-overdue effort such resolve will be sufficient.

Notes

1. *Congressional Record*, June 21, 1974, p. S 11221.
2. President Richard M. Nixon, *Message to the Congress*, July 26, 1962 (H. Doc. 92-329).
3. PL 92-599 (October 27, 1972).
4. U.S. Congress, Joint Study Committee on Budget Control, *Recommendations for Improving Control over Budget Outlays and Receipt Totals*, Report, 92d Congress, 2nd Session, April 18, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).
5. These include anti-impoundment provisions of PL 92-599 (October 27, 1972) and PL 93-9 (March 8, 1973); legislation to restrict the President's authority over budget estimates of independent regulatory commissions in S 544, 92d Congress, 2nd Session; and the requirement of confirmation of future OMB Directors in PL 93-250 (March 2, 1974).
6. For a history of efforts from 1789 to World War II, see Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., *The Spending Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943). A significant recent source is U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *Improving Congressional Control of the Budget: A Compendium of Materials*, March 27, 1973, 93rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), Committee Print. Pp. 473-484 are devoted to a selected bibliography by Louis Fisher. For background and a summary of events prior to the Conference Committee report, see James J. Finley, "Congressional Budgetmaking-'74," *The Federal Accountant*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 1974), pp. 23-34.
7. H. Res. No. 5 and S. Res. No. 17, 94th Congress. See *Congressional Record*, January 14, 1975, p. H5 and January 17, 1975, pp. S510 f.
8. For an account of selection procedures, an analysis of past voting records of committee members, and initial staff selection, see Joel Havemann, "Congress Report/New Budget Committees Already Have Ambitious Plans," *National Journal Reports*, Vol. 6, No. 39 (September 28, 1974), pp. 1445-1453.
9. For an account of the appointment and initial views, see Joel Havemann, "Congress Report/Alice Rivlin Named Chief of Congressional Budget Office," *National Journal Reports*, Vol. 7, No. 9 (March 1, 1975), p. 322.
10. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974*, Conference Report . . . HR 7130, (S. Rept. 93-924), June 12, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 52.
11. Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., as quoted by Joel Havemann, "Congress Report/House, Senate Disagree on Director for New Budget Office," *National Journal Reports*, Vol. 6, No. 52 (December 28, 1974), p. 1960.
12. PL 93-344, Sect. 202 (f).
13. *Conference Report*, p. 56.
14. "Congressional Budget Reform: Will it Work?" *Con-*

gressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 32, No. 36 (September 7, 1974), pp. 2415 f.; Haveman, "New Budget Committees," *op. cit.*, pp. 1446, 1453.

15. U.S., *The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1976* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 162-193. Also included as required are: (1) estimates of tax expenditures for the budget year; (2) five-year projections of estimated outlays, budget authority, and receipts; and (3) information regarding estimates for programs for which advance appropriations have been authorized. Although not required for another two years, comparisons of actual uncontrollable outlays and total receipts for the past fiscal year compared with

initial estimates are also included.

16. PL 93-344, Sect. 301 (b) 2.

17. Regarding GAO evaluation activities, see Keith E. Marvin and James L. Hedrick, "GAO Helps Congress Evaluate Programs," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (July/August 1974), pp. 327-333, and Ellsworth H. Morse, Jr., "The Challenge to Federal Accountants in Improving Congressional Control of the Budget," *The Federal Accountant*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1974), pp. 59-68.

18. PL 93-529, approved December 21, 1974. See *Congressional Record*, December 4, 1974, pp. 11286 ff, and December 10, 1974, pp. S20998 f, for the House and Senate actions.

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