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- Facts:
- Following indictment alleging violation of federal statutes by certain
staff members of the White House and political supporters of the
President, the Special Prosecutor filed a motion under Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 17 (c) for a subpoena duces tecum for the production before trial
of certain tapes and documents relating to precisely identified
conversations and meetings between the President and others.
- The President, claiming executive privilege, filed a motion to quash the
subpoena.
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- This litigation presents for review the denial of a motion, filed in the
District Court on behalf of the President of the United States, in the
case of United States v. Mitchell (D.C. Crim. No. 74-110),
- to quash a third-party subpoena duces tecum issued by the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. The subpoena directed the
President to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to
his conversations with aides and advisers
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- In the District Court, the President's counsel argued that the court
lacked jurisdiction to issue the subpoena because the matter was an
intra-branch dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the
Executive Branch and hence not subject to judicial resolution.
- That argument has been renewed in this Court with emphasis on the
contention that the dispute does not present a "case" or
"controversy" which can be adjudicated in the federal courts.
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- The President's counsel argues that the federal courts should not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of Government.
- He views the present dispute as essentially a "jurisdictional"
dispute within the Executive Branch which he analogizes to a dispute
between two congressional committees.
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- Since the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, it is contended that a
President's decision is final in determining what evidence is to be used
in a given criminal case.
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- The mere assertion of a claim of an "intra-branch dispute,"
without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction;
justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry.
- Our starting point is the nature of the proceeding for which the
evidence is sought - here a pending criminal prosecution. It is a
judicial proceeding in a federal court alleging violation of federal
laws and is brought in the name of the United States as sovereign.
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- Acting pursuant to [his authority under an Executive Order in May 1973
which established the Office of the Special Prosecutor] the Attorney
General has delegated the authority to represent the United States in
these particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with unique authority
and tenure.
- The regulation gives the Special Prosecutor explicit power to contest
the invocation of executive privilege in the process of seeking evidence
deemed relevant to the performance of these specially delegated duties
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- So long as this regulation is extant it has the force of law.
- The demands of and the resistance to the subpoena present an obvious
controversy in the ordinary sense, but that alone is not sufficient to
meet constitutional standards.
- In the constitutional sense, controversy means more than disagreement
and conflict; rather it means the kind of controversy courts
traditionally resolve.
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- The independent Special Prosecutor with his asserted need for the
subpoenaed material in the underlying criminal prosecution is opposed by
the President with his steadfast assertion of privilege against
disclosure of the material.
- This setting assures there is "that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S., at 204 .
- Moreover, since the matter is one arising in the regular course of a
federal criminal prosecution, it is within the traditional scope of Art.
III power.
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- (c) Producing Documents and Objects.
- (1) In General.
- A subpoena may order the witness to produce any books, papers,
documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates. The court may
direct the witness to produce the designated items in court before trial
or before they are to be offered in evidence. When the items arrive, the
court may permit the parties and their attorneys to inspect all or part
of them.
- (2) Quashing or Modifying the Subpoena.
- On motion made promptly, the court may quash or modify the subpoena if
compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.
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- The District Court, after treating the subpoenaed material as
presumptively privileged, concluded that the Special Prosecutor had made
a sufficient showing to rebut the presumption and that the requirements
of Rule 17 (c) had been satisfied.
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- The District court thereafter issued an order for an in camera
examination of the subpoenaed material, having rejected the President's
contentions
- (a) that the dispute between him and the Special Prosecutor was
nonjusticiable as an "intra-executive" conflict and
- (b) that the judiciary lacked authority to review the President's
assertion of executive privilege.
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- The court stayed its order pending appellate review, which the President
then sought in the Court of Appeals. The Special Prosecutor then filed
in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and
the President filed a cross-petition for such a writ challenging the
grand-jury action.
- The Supreme Court granted both petitions.
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- Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need
for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can
sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from
judicial process under all circumstances.
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- Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive
national security secrets, the confidentiality of Presidential
communications is not significantly diminished
- by producing material for a criminal trial under the protected
conditions of in camera inspection, and any absolute executive privilege
under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with the
function of the courts under the Constitution.
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- The courts will afford the utmost deference to Presidential acts in the
performance of an Art. II function, United States v. Burr (1807), but
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- when a claim of Presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for
use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on the ground that
military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground
of a generalized interest in confidentiality,
- the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and
the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration
of criminal justice.
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- Since a President's communications encompass a vastly wider range of
sensitive material than would be true of an ordinary individual, the
public interest requires that Presidential confidentiality be afforded
the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of
justice
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- The District Court has a heavy responsibility to ensure that material
involving Presidential conversations irrelevant to or inadmissible in
the criminal prosecution be accorded the high degree of respect due a
President and that such material be returned under seal to its lawful
custodian.
- Until released to the Special Prosecutor no in camera material is to be
released to anyone.
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