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Outline
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UNITED STATES v. NIXON, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
  • Facts:
  • Following indictment alleging violation of federal statutes by certain staff members of the White House and political supporters of the President, the Special Prosecutor filed a motion under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17 (c) for a subpoena duces tecum for the production before trial of certain tapes and documents relating to precisely identified conversations and meetings between the President and others.


  • The President, claiming executive privilege, filed a motion to quash the subpoena.
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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
  • This litigation presents for review the denial of a motion, filed in the District Court on behalf of the President of the United States, in the case of United States v. Mitchell (D.C. Crim. No. 74-110),


  • to quash a third-party subpoena duces tecum issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The subpoena directed the President to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aides and advisers
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JUSTICIABILITY
  • In the District Court, the President's counsel argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the subpoena because the matter was an intra-branch dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the Executive Branch and hence not subject to judicial resolution.


  • That argument has been renewed in this Court with emphasis on the contention that the dispute does not present a "case" or "controversy" which can be adjudicated in the federal courts.
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Separation of Powers
  • The President's counsel argues that the federal courts should not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of Government.


  • He views the present dispute as essentially a "jurisdictional" dispute within the Executive Branch which he analogizes to a dispute between two congressional committees.
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Prosecutorial Power is Executive
  • Since the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, it is contended that a President's decision is final in determining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal case.


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Determining Intra-Branch Immunity from Judicial Process
  • The mere assertion of a claim of an "intra-branch dispute," without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry.


  • Our starting point is the nature of the proceeding for which the evidence is sought - here a pending criminal prosecution. It is a judicial proceeding in a federal court alleging violation of federal laws and is brought in the name of the United States as sovereign.
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Special Prosecutor
  • Acting pursuant to [his authority under an Executive Order in May 1973 which established the Office of the Special Prosecutor] the Attorney General has delegated the authority to represent the United States in these particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with unique authority and tenure.


  • The regulation gives the Special Prosecutor explicit power to contest the invocation of executive privilege in the process of seeking evidence deemed relevant to the performance of these specially delegated duties
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Case and Controversy Rule
  • So long as this regulation is extant it has the force of law.


  • The demands of and the resistance to the subpoena present an obvious controversy in the ordinary sense, but that alone is not sufficient to meet constitutional standards.


  • In the constitutional sense, controversy means more than disagreement and conflict; rather it means the kind of controversy courts traditionally resolve.
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Justiciable Controversy Exists
  • The independent Special Prosecutor with his asserted need for the subpoenaed material in the underlying criminal prosecution is opposed by the President with his steadfast assertion of privilege against disclosure of the material.


  • This setting assures there is "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S., at 204 .


  • Moreover, since the matter is one arising in the regular course of a federal criminal prosecution, it is within the traditional scope of Art. III power.
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Federal Rule 17
  • (c) Producing Documents and Objects.
  • (1) In General.
  • A subpoena may order the witness to produce any books, papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates. The court may direct the witness to produce the designated items in court before trial or before they are to be offered in evidence. When the items arrive, the court may permit the parties and their attorneys to inspect all or part of them.


  • (2) Quashing or Modifying the Subpoena.
  • On motion made promptly, the court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.
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District Court Ruling
  • The District Court, after treating the subpoenaed material as presumptively privileged, concluded that the Special Prosecutor had made a sufficient showing to rebut the presumption and that the requirements of Rule 17 (c) had been satisfied.
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District Court Order
  • The District court thereafter issued an order for an in camera examination of the subpoenaed material, having rejected the President's contentions


  • (a) that the dispute between him and the Special Prosecutor was nonjusticiable as an "intra-executive" conflict and


  • (b) that the judiciary lacked authority to review the President's assertion of executive privilege.


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Route to the Supreme Court
  • The court stayed its order pending appellate review, which the President then sought in the Court of Appeals. The Special Prosecutor then filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment and the President filed a cross-petition for such a writ challenging the grand-jury action.


  • The Supreme Court granted both petitions.
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Chief Justice Burger's Ruling: Separation of Powers
  • Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.


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Presidential Claim of Privilege Lacking
  • Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the confidentiality of  Presidential communications is not significantly diminished


  • by producing material for a criminal trial under the protected conditions of in camera inspection, and any absolute executive privilege under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under the Constitution.
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Balancing the President's Claim of Executive Privilege with the Rights of the Accused in a Criminal Trial
  • The courts will afford the utmost deference to Presidential acts in the performance of an Art. II function, United States v. Burr (1807), but
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President's Generalized Assertion of Privilege Inadequate
  • when a claim of Presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality,


  • the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.


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Executive Privilege Recognized as a General Principle
  • Since a President's communications encompass a vastly wider range of sensitive material than would be true of an ordinary individual, the public interest requires that Presidential confidentiality be afforded the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice
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District Court Responsibility
  • The District Court has a heavy responsibility to ensure that material involving Presidential conversations irrelevant to or inadmissible in the criminal prosecution be accorded the high degree of respect due a President and that such material be returned under seal to its lawful custodian.


  • Until released to the Special Prosecutor no in camera material is to be released to anyone.