Dualism: the view that mind and matter (body) are distinct and independent kinds of substances ( Descartes, 1596-1650).
Subjective Idealism: the view that the body itself is nothing but a collection of actual or possible sights, sounds, touches and smells. George Berkeley (1685-1753).
Materialism: the view that the mind is reducible to matter.
Epiphenomenalism: the view that mind is not itself a material thing, but is a distinct and causally impotent by-product (an "epi-phenomenon") of the brain or the world represented by physics.
Double- or Dual- Aspect Theories: those views that deny that the mind and body are distinct and independent substances, each capable of "existing" on its own, but rather are two "aspects" of a substance that in itself is neither mental nor physical. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and P. F. Strawson.
Identity Theory: the view that holds that mental events (aches and pains, sensations, qualia, thoughts and desires) are simply identical with brain processes - in the way (for an example) lightning flashes are "identical" with electrical discharges.
Eliminative Materialism: the view that mental states, as they are ordinarily understood by us, have the status like that of witches and phlogiston or the elan vital and should simply be deleted from our theorizing about ourselves. Paul Churchland.